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A relation between inﬂation and the path of average
marginal cost (often measured by unit labor cost) implied by
the Calvo (1983) model of staggered pricing—sometimes re-
ferred to as the “New Keynesian” Phillips curve—has been the
subject of extensive econometric estimation and testing. Stan-
dard theoretical justiﬁcations of this form of aggregate-supply
relation, however, either assume (1) the existence of a com-
petitive rental market for capital services, so that the shadow
cost of capital services is equated across ﬁrms and sectors at all
points in time, despite the fact that prices are set at diﬀerent
times, or (2) that the capital stock of each ﬁrm is constant,
or at any rate exogenously given, and so independent of the
ﬁrm’s pricing decision. But neither assumption is realistic. The
present paper examines the extent to which existing empirical
speciﬁcations and interpretations of parameter estimates are
compromised by reliance on either of these assumptions.
The paper derives an aggregate-supply relation for a model
with monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing in which cap-
ital is ﬁrm speciﬁc and endogenous, and investment is subject
to convex adjustment costs. The aggregate-supply relation is
shown to again take the standard New Keynesian form, but
with an elasticity of inﬂation with respect to real marginal cost
that is a diﬀerent function of underlying parameters than in
the simpler cases studied earlier. Thus the relations estimated
in the empirical literature remain correctly speciﬁed under the
assumptions proposed here, but the interpretation of the esti-
mated elasticity is diﬀerent; in particular, the implications of
the estimated Phillips-curve slope for the frequency of price
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adjustment is changed. Assuming a rental market for capi-
tal results in a substantial exaggeration of the infrequency of
price adjustment; assuming exogenous capital instead results
in a smaller underestimate.
JEL Codes: E30.
A popular speciﬁcation in recent analyses of alternative monetary
policies is the “New Keynesian” Phillips curve,
πt = ξsˆt + βEtπt+1, (1)
where πt is the rate of inﬂation, sˆt is the departure of the (average)
log of real marginal cost from its steady-state value, the coeﬃcient
ξ > 0 depends on the degree of stickiness of prices, and 0 < β < 1 is a
utility discount factor that, under an empirically realistic calibration,
must nearly equal 1. As is well known, this relation follows (in a
log-linear approximation) from the Calvo model of staggered price
setting under certain assumptions.1 The implications of (1) for the
co-movement of the general level of prices and marginal cost have
been subject to extensive econometric testing, beginning with the
work of Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002).
In standard derivations, (1) follows from the optimal pricing
problem of a ﬁrm that adjusts the price of its product at random
intervals, under the assumption that the marginal cost St(i) of sup-
plying a given good i in period t is given by a function of the form
St(i) = S(yt(i);Xt), (2)
where yt(i) is the quantity sold of good i in that period, and Xt is
a vector of variables that ﬁrm i takes to be unaﬀected by its pricing
decision. Under the further assumption of a demand curve of the
form yt(i) = Y (pt(i);Xt), this implies that marginal cost can be
expressed as a function of the price pt(i) that i chooses to charge
in that period, together with variables that are unaﬀected by its
actions.
The speciﬁcation (2) is in turn correct as long as all factors of
production are either purchased on a spot market (at a price that
1See, e.g., Woodford (2003, chap. 3, sec. 2.2).
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is independent of the quantity used by i), or completely ﬁxed. In
particular, one can treat the case in which capital is not a variable
factor of production (and output is simply a concave function of
the variable labor input, as in Woodford 2003, chap. 3), or the case
in which capital is variable, but capital services are obtained on a
rental market (as in Gal´ı and Gertler [1999] and the baseline case
considered in Sbordone [2002]).2 Matters are more complex, however,
under the more realistic assumption that capital is endogenous and
ﬁrm speciﬁc. That is, we shall assume that each ﬁrm accumulates
capital for its own use only, and that (as in standard neoclassical
investment theory) there are convex costs of more rapid adjustment
of an individual ﬁrm’s capital stock. In this case, St(i) will depend
not only on the quantity that ﬁrm i produces in period t, but also
on the ﬁrm’s capital stock in that period, and this latter variable
depends on the ﬁrm’s decisions in previous periods, including its
previous pricing decisions. The dynamic linkages in a ﬁrm’s optimal
price-setting decision are therefore more complex in this case than
is assumed in standard derivations of the New Keynesian Phillips
curve.
Here I treat the optimal price-setting problem in a model with
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, and show that once again a relation of the form
(1) can be derived.3 Hence the econometric estimates reported by
authors such as Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) can
be interpreted without making assumptions as restrictive as those
papers had appeared to rely upon. However, the coeﬃcient ξ is a
more complex function of underlying model parameters, such as the
frequency with which prices are reoptimized, in the case that capital
is ﬁrm speciﬁc.
This is potentially of considerable importance for the interpre-
tation of econometric estimates of the coeﬃcient ξ. Estimates of ξ
are often interpreted in terms of the frequency of price of adjustment
that they imply, given estimated or calibrated values for other model
parameters. (Indeed, in many papers in the literature, beginning with
2Both assumptions lead to a relation of the form (1). However, the interpre-
tation of the coeﬃcient ξ in terms of underlying model parameters is diﬀerent in
the two cases, as discussed in Sbordone (2002).
3The derivation here corrects the analysis given in Woodford (2003, chap. 5,
sec. 3), to take account of an error in the original calculations noted by Sveen
and Weinke (2004a).
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Gal´ı and Gertler [1999], equation [1] is estimated in a form that re-
sults directly in an estimate of the frequency of price adjustment
rather than of the elasticity ξ.) Furthermore, it is often argued that
estimated values of ξ are so small as to imply that prices are sticky
for an implausibly long length of time; this is taken to cast doubt on
the realism of the Calvo pricing model and hence of the aggregate-
supply speciﬁcation (1). But the mapping between the frequency of
price adjustment and the value of ξ is diﬀerent in the case of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital than under the more common assumption of a rental
market for capital services.4 The assumption of a rental market for
capital substantially weakens the degree of strategic complementar-
ity among the pricing decisions of diﬀerent ﬁrms—or alternatively,
it reduces the importance of real rigidities in the sense of Ball and
Romer (1990)—with the consequence that ξ is larger for any given
frequency of price adjustment. It then follows that a small estimated
value of ξ will be taken to imply very infrequent price adjustment.
But allowing for ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital can make the implied frequency
of price adjustment much greater, as shown in section 3.4 below.
The fact that an assumption that capital is ﬁrm speciﬁc will lead
to a lower estimate of the degree of price stickiness was ﬁrst demon-
strated by Sbordone (1998) and also illustrated by Gal´ı, Gertler,
and Lopez-Salido (2001). However, in these papers, the treatment
of capital as ﬁrm speciﬁc is accompanied (at least implicitly) by an
assumption that the capital stock of each ﬁrm is exogenously given,
as in the analysis in Woodford (2003, chap. 3), rather than respond-
ing endogenously to the ﬁrm’s incentives to invest. This is because
it is only in this case that a speciﬁcation of the form (2) remains
consistent with the assumption of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. The analy-
sis here instead presents an analysis of aggregate supply in the case
that capital is both ﬁrm speciﬁc and endogenous.5 This case is a
4It is also diﬀerent under the assumption of a ﬁxed quantity of capital for each
ﬁrm, as noted above. However, that simple model is disconﬁrmed by the observa-
tion that capital varies over time, and that investment spending is substantially
aﬀected by monetary disturbances.
5Subsequent to the ﬁrst circulation of these notes, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2004), Altig et al. (2005), and Matheron (2005) have built on the analysis here
to examine the consequences of endogenous ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital for the estimated
frequency of price adjustment in empirical versions of the New Keynesian Phillips
curve. These authors extend the present analysis to more complicated versions
of (1) that allow a closer ﬁt to aggregate U.S. time series.
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good deal more complicated to analyze, but it turns out still to be
possible to derive an aggregate-supply relation that (in a log-linear
approximation) takes the simple form (1).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, I introduce a model
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment demand with convex costs of adjustment
of an individual ﬁrm’s capital stock, with particular attention to
the way in which standard neoclassical investment theory must be
modiﬁed when the ﬁrm is not a price-taker in its product market, but
instead ﬁxes its price for a period of time and ﬁlls whatever orders it
may receive. In section 2, I then consider the price-setting problem
of such a ﬁrm, under the assumption that the price remains ﬁxed for
a random interval of time, and characterize the joint dynamics of the
ﬁrm’s price and its capital stock. Finally, in section 3, I derive the
model’s implications for the form of the aggregate-supply relation
that connects the overall inﬂation rate with the overall level of real
activity, and discuss the consequences for the inference about the
frequency of price adjustment that can be drawn from an estimate
of the elasticity ξ in (1).
1. Investment Demand when Prices Are Sticky
I wish to analyze the relation between inﬂation and aggregate out-
put in a model with staggered pricing (modeled after the fashion
of Calvo [1983] and Yun [1996]) and endogenous capital accumu-
lation. The main source of complication in this analysis is the as-
sumption that the producers of individual diﬀerentiated goods (that
adjust their prices at diﬀerent dates) invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital
that is relatively durable, so that the distribution of capital stocks
across diﬀerent ﬁrms (as a result of diﬀering histories of price ad-
justment) matters, and not simply the economy’s aggregate capital
stock. Nonetheless, I shall show that (in the same kind of log-linear
approximation that is used in standard derivations of the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve) it is possible to derive structural relations that
constitute the “aggregate supply block” of a macro model, which in-
volve only the economy’s aggregate capital stock, aggregate output,
and overall index of prices.
A ﬁrst task is to develop a model of optimizing investment de-
mand by suppliers with sticky prices, and that are demand con-
strained as a result. As in the sticky-price models with exogenous
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capital presented in Woodford (2003, chap. 3), there is a continuum
of diﬀerentiated goods, each supplied by a single (monopolistically
competitive) ﬁrm. The production function for good i is assumed to
be of the form
yt(i) = kt(i)f(Atht(i)/kt(i)), (3)
where f is an increasing, concave function, with f(0) = 0. I assume
that each monopoly supplier makes an independent investment deci-
sion each period; there is a separate capital stock kt(i) for each good,
which can be used only in the production of good i.
I also assume convex adjustment costs for investment by each
ﬁrm, of the usual kind assumed in neoclassical investment theory.
Increasing the capital stock to the level kt+1(i) in period t+1 requires
investment spending in the amount It(i) = I(kt+1(i)/kt(i))kt(i) in
period t. Here It(i) represents purchases by ﬁrm i of the composite
good, deﬁned as the usual Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate over purchases of
each of the continuum of goods (with the same constant elasticity of
substitution θ > 1 as for consumption purchases).6 In this way, the
allocation of investment expenditure across the various goods is in
exactly the same proportion as consumption expenditure, resulting
in a demand curve for each producer that is again of the form
yt(i) = Yt
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
, (4)
but where now aggregate demand is given by Yt = Ct + It + Gt,
in which expression Ct is the representative household’s demand
for the composite good for consumption purposes, Gt is the gov-
ernment’s demand for the composite good (treated as an exogenous
random variable), and It denotes the integral of It(i) over the various
ﬁrms i.
I assume as usual that the function I(·) is increasing and convex;
the convexity implies the existence of costs of adjustment. I further
assume that near a zero growth rate of the capital stock, this func-
tion satisﬁes I(1) = δ, I ′(1) = 1, and I ′′(1) = ψ, where 0 < δ < 1
and ψ > 0 are parameters. This implies that in the steady state to
which the economy converges in the absence of shocks (which here
6See Woodford (2003, chap. 3) for discussion of this aggregator and its con-
sequences for the optimal allocation of demand across alternative diﬀerentiated
goods.
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involves a constant capital stock, as I abstract from trend growth),
the steady rate of investment spending required to maintain the cap-
ital stock is equal to δ times the steady-state capital stock (so that
δ can be interpreted as the rate of depreciation). It also implies that
near the steady state, a marginal unit of investment spending in-
creases the capital stock by an equal amount (as there are locally
no adjustment costs). Finally, in my log-linear approximation to the
equilibrium dynamics, ψ is the parameter that indexes the degree
of adjustment costs. A central goal of the analysis is consideration
of the consequences of alternative values for ψ; the model with ex-
ogenous ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital presented in Woodford (2003, chaps. 3,
4) is recovered as the limiting case of the present model in which ψ
is made unboundedly large.
Proﬁt-maximization by ﬁrm i then implies that the capital stock
for period t + 1 will be chosen in period t to satisfy the ﬁrst-order
condition
I ′(gt(i)) = EtQt,t+1Πt+1
{
ρt+1(i)
+ gt+1(i)I ′(gt+1(i))− I(gt+1(i))
}
, (5)
where gt(i) ≡ kt+1(i)/kt(i), ρt+1(i) is the (real) shadow value of a
marginal unit of additional capital for use by ﬁrm i in period t + 1
production, and Qt,t+1Πt+1 is the stochastic discount factor for eval-
uating real income streams received in period t + 1. Expressing the
real stochastic discount factor as βλt+1/λt, where λt is the repre-
sentative household’s marginal utility of real income in period t and
0 < β < 1 is the utility discount factor, and then log-linearizing (5)
around the steady-state values of all state variables, we obtain
λˆt + ψ(kˆt+1(i)− kˆt(i)) = Etλˆt+1 + [1− β(1− δ)]Etρˆt+1(i)
+ βψEt(kˆt+2(i)− kˆt+1(i)), (6)
where λˆt ≡ log(λt/λ¯), kˆt(i) ≡ log(kt(i)/K¯), ρˆt(i) ≡ log(ρt(i)/ρ¯), and
variables with bars denote steady-state values.
Note that ρt+1(i) would correspond to the real “rental price” for
capital services if a market existed for such services, though I do not
assume one here.7 It is not possible in the present model to equate
7The case in which there is a rental market for capital services is instead
considered in section 3.2 below.
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this quantity with the marginal product, or even the marginal rev-
enue product of capital (using the demand curve [4] to compute
marginal revenue), for suppliers are demand constrained in their
sales, given the prices that they have posted; it is not possible to
increase sales by moving down the demand curve. Thus the shadow
value of additional capital must instead be computed as the reduc-
tion in labor costs through substitution of capital inputs for labor,
while still supplying the quantity of output that happens to be de-
manded. In this way I obtain
ρt(i) = wt(i)
(
f(h˜t(i))− h˜t(i)f ′(h˜t(i))
Atf ′(h˜t(i))
)
,
where wt(i) is the real wage for labor of the kind hired by ﬁrm i and
h˜t(i) ≡ Atht(i)/kt(i) is ﬁrm i’s eﬀective labor-capital input ratio.8
I can alternatively express this in terms of the output-capital ratio
for ﬁrm i (in order to derive an “accelerator” model of investment
demand), by substituting (3) to obtain
ρt(i) =
wt(i)
At
f−1(yt(i)/kt(i))[φ(yt(i)/kt(i))− 1], (7)
where φ(y/k) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of the function f ,
evaluated at the argument f−1(y/k).
As in the baseline model treated in Woodford (2003, chap. 3),
I shall assume a sector-speciﬁc labor market. In this case, the ﬁrst-
order condition for optimizing labor supply can be written in the
form
wt(i) =
vh(f−1(yt(i)/kt(i))kt(i)/At; ξt)
λt
, (8)
where labor demand has been expressed as a function of the demand
for good i. This can be log-linearized as
wˆt(i) = ν(hˆt(i)− h¯t)− λˆt,
8Note that in the case of a ﬂexible-price model, the ratio of wt(i) to the
denominator would always equal marginal revenue, and so this expression would
equal the marginal revenue product of capital, though it would be a relatively
cumbersome way of writing it.
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where ν > 0 is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor with
respect to labor supply, and h¯t is an exogenous disturbance to pref-
erences, indicating the percentage increase in labor supply needed to
maintain a constant marginal disutility of working. Substituting (8)
into (7) and log-linearizing, I obtain
ρˆt(i) =
(
νφh +
φh
φh − 1
ωp
)
(yˆt(i)− kˆt(i)) + νkˆt(i)− λˆt − ωqt, (9)
where φh > 1 is the steady-state value of φ(y/k) (i.e., the reciprocal
of the elasticity of the production function with respect to the labor
input), and ωp > 0 is the negative of the elasticity of the marginal
product f ′(f−1(y/k)) with respect to y/k. The composite exogenous
disturbance qt is deﬁned as
qt ≡ ω−1[νh¯t + (1 + ν)at],
where at ≡ logAt; it indicates the percentage change in output re-
quired to maintain a constant marginal disutility of output supply,
in the case that the ﬁrm’s capital remains at its steady-state level.9
Substituting (9) into (6), I then have an equation to solve for the dy-
namics of ﬁrm i’s capital stock, given the evolution of demand yˆt(i)
for its product, the marginal utility of income λˆt, and the exogenous
disturbance qt.
As the coeﬃcients of these equations are the same for each ﬁrm,
an equation of the same form holds for the dynamics of the aggre-
gate capital stock (in our log-linear approximation). The equilibrium
condition for the dynamics of the capital stock is thus of the form
λˆt + ψ(Kˆt+1 − Kˆt) = β(1− δ)Etλˆt+1 +
[1− β(1− δ)][ρyEtYˆt+1 − ρkKˆt+1 − ωEtqt+1] + βψEt(Kˆt+2 − Kˆt+1),
(10)
where the elasticities of the marginal valuation of capital are given
by
ρy ≡ νφh +
φh
φh − 1
ωp > ρk ≡ ρy − ν > 0.
9That is, qt measures the output change that would be required to maintain a
ﬁxed marginal disutility of supply given possible ﬂuctuations in preferences and
technology, but not taking account of the eﬀect of possible ﬂuctuations in the
ﬁrm’s capital stock. With this modiﬁcation of the deﬁnition given in Woodford
(2003, chap. 3) for the model with exogenous capital, qt is again an exogenous
disturbance term.
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The implied dynamics of investment spending are then given by
Iˆt = k[Kˆt+1 − (1− δ)Kˆt], (11)
where Iˆt is deﬁned as the percentage deviation of investment from its
steady-state level, as a share of steady-state output, and k ≡ K¯/Y¯
is the steady-state capital-output ratio.
Thus far I have derived investment dynamics as a function of the
evolution of the marginal utility of real income of the representative
household. This is in turn related to aggregate spending through the
relation λt = uc(Yt − It −Gt; ξt), which we may log-linearize as
λˆt = −σ−1(Yˆt − Iˆt − gt), (12)
where the composite disturbance gt reﬂects the eﬀects both of gov-
ernment purchases and of shifts in private impatience to consume.10
Finally, because of the relation between the marginal utility of in-
come process and the stochastic discount factor that prices bonds,11
the nominal interest rate must satisfy
1 + it = {βEt[λt+1/(λtΠt+1)]}−1,
which one may log-linearize as
ıˆt = Etπt+1 + λˆt − Etλˆt+1. (13)
The system of equations (10)–(13) then comprises the “IS block” of
the model. These jointly suﬃce to determine the paths of the vari-
ables {Yˆt, Iˆt, Kˆt, λt}, given an initial capital stock and the evolution
of short-term real interest rates {ıˆt −Etπt+1}. The nature of the ef-
fects of real interest-rate expectations on these variables is discussed
further in Woodford (2004).
10Note that the parameter σ in this equation is not precisely the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption, but rather C¯/Y¯ times that elasticity.
In a model with investment, these quantities are not exactly the same, even in
the absence of government purchases.
11See Woodford (2003, chaps. 2, 4) for further discussion of the stochastic
discount factor and the Fisher relation between the nominal interest rate and
expected inﬂation.
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2. Optimal Price Setting with Endogenous Capital
I turn next to the implications of an endogenous capital stock for
the price-setting decisions of ﬁrms. The capital stock aﬀects a ﬁrm’s
marginal cost, of course; but more subtly, a ﬁrm considering how its
future proﬁts will be aﬀected by the price it sets must also consider
how its capital stock will evolve over the time that its price remains
ﬁxed.
I begin with the consequences for the relation between marginal
cost and output. Real marginal cost can be expressed as the ratio of
the real wage to the marginal product of labor,
st(i) =
wt(i)
Atf ′(f−1(yt(i)/kt(i)))
. (14)
Again writing the factor input ratio as a function of the capital-
output ratio, and using (8) for the real wage, we obtain
st(i) =
vh(f−1(yt(i)/kt(i))kt(i)/At; ξt)
λtAtf ′(f−1(yt(i)/kt(i)))
(15)
for the real marginal cost of supplying good i. This can be log-
linearized to yield
sˆt(i) = ω(yˆt(i)− kˆt(i)− qt) + νkˆt(i)− λˆt, (16)
where sˆt(i) ≡ log(st(i)/s¯), and ω ≡ ωw + ωp ≡ νφh + ωp > 0 is
the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to a ﬁrm’s own output.
Letting sˆt without the index i denote the average level of real
marginal cost in the economy as a whole, I note that (16) implies
that
sˆt(i) = sˆt + ω(yˆt(i)− Yˆt)− (ω − ν)(kˆt(i)− Kˆt). (17)
Then using (4) to substitute for the relative output of ﬁrm i in (17),
one obtains
sˆt(i) = sˆt − (ω − ν)k˜t(i)− ωθp˜t(i), (18)
where p˜t(i) ≡ log(pt(i)/Pt) is the ﬁrm’s log relative price, and k˜t(i) ≡
kˆt(i)− Kˆt is its log relative capital stock. Note also that the average
level of real marginal cost satisﬁes
sˆt = ω(Yˆt − Kˆt − qt) + νKˆt − λˆt. (19)
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Following the same logic as in Woodford (2003, chap. 3), the
Calvo price-setting framework implies that if a ﬁrm i resets its price
in period t, it chooses a price that satisﬁes the (log-linear approxi-
mate) ﬁrst-order condition
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEˆit [p˜t+k(i)− sˆt+k(i)] = 0, (20)
where 0 < α < 1 is the fraction of prices that are not reset in
any period. Here I introduce the notation Eˆit for an expectation
conditional on the state of the world at date t, but integrating only
over those future states in which i has not reset its price since period
t. Note that in the case of any aggregate-state variable xt (i.e., a
variable the value of which depends only on the history of aggregate
disturbances, and not on the individual circumstances of ﬁrm i),
EˆitxT = EtxT , for any date T ≥ t. However, the two conditional
expectations diﬀer in the case of variables that depend on the relative
price or relative capital stock of ﬁrm i. For example,
Eˆit p˜t+k(i) = p˜t(i)−
k∑
j=1
Etπt+j (21)
for any k ≥ 1, since ﬁrm i’s price remains unchanged along all of the
histories that are integrated over in this case. Instead, the expecta-
tion when one integrates over all possible future states conditional
upon the state of the world at date t is given by
Etp˜t+1(i) = α[p˜t(i)− Etπt+1] + (1− α)Etpˆ∗t+1(i), (22)
where pˆ∗t (i) is the (log) relative price chosen when i reconsiders its
price at date t. (Similar expressions can be given for horizons k > 1.)
Substituting (18) for st+k(i) and (21) for Eˆit p˜t+k(i) in (20), one
obtains
(1 + ωθ)pˆ∗t (i) =
(1− αβ)
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEˆit

sˆt+k + (1 + ωθ) k∑
j=1
πt+j − (ω − ν)k˜t+k(i)


(23)
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for the optimal relative price that should be chosen by a ﬁrm that
resets its price at date t. This relation diﬀers from the result obtained
in Woodford (2003, chap. 3) for a model with exogenous capital only
in the presence of the Eˆit k˜t+k(i) terms.
The additional terms complicate the analysis in several re-
spects. Note that the ﬁrst two terms inside the square brackets are
aggregate-state variables, so that the distinction between Eˆit and Et
would not matter in this expression, were it not for the dependence
of marginal cost on i’s relative capital stock; it is for this reason that
the alternative form of conditional expectation did not have to be
introduced in Woodford (2003, chap. 3). However, in the model with
endogenous capital, it is important to make this distinction when
evaluating the Eˆit k˜t+k(i) terms.
12 Furthermore, these new terms will
not have the same value for all ﬁrms i that reset their prices at date
t, for they will depend on i’s relative capital stock k˜t(i) at the time
that prices are reconsidered; hence p∗t (i) is no longer independent
of i, as in the model with exogenous capital (or a model with an
economy-wide rental market for capital). And ﬁnally, (23) is not yet
a complete solution for the optimal price-setting rule, since the value
of the right-hand side still depends on the expected evolution of i’s
relative capital stock; this in turn depends on the expected evolution
of i’s relative price, which depends on the choice of pˆ∗t (i). A complete
solution for this decision rule requires that one consider the eﬀect of
a ﬁrm’s relative price on the evolution of its relative capital stock.
2.1 Dynamics of the Relative Capital Stock
Equation (10) implies that i’s relative capital stock must evolve in
accordance with the relation
ψ(k˜t+1(i)− k˜t(i)) = [1− β(1− δ)][ρyEt(yˆt+1(i)− Yˆt)− ρkk˜t+1(i)]
+βψEt(k˜t+2(i)− k˜t+1(i)).
Again using i’s demand curve to express relative output as a function
of the ﬁrm’s relative price, this can be written as
Et[Q(L)k˜t+2(i)] = ΞEtp˜t+1(i), (24)
12It is the failure to distinguish between Eˆit and Et in evaluating these terms
that results in the incorrect calculations in the treatment of the present model
in Woodford (2003, chap. 5) noted by Sveen and Weinke (2004a).
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where the lag polynomial is
Q(L) ≡ β − [1 + β + (1− β(1− δ))ρk−1ψ ]L + L2,
and
Ξ ≡ (1− β(1− δ))ρyθ−1ψ > 0.
I note for later reference that the lag polynomial can be factored as
Q(L) = β(1− µ1L)(1− µ2L).
Given that Q(0) = β > 0, Q(β) < 0, Q(1) < 0, and that Q(z) > 0
for all large enough z > 0, one sees that µ1, µ2 must be two real roots
that satisfy 0 < µ1 < 1 < β
−1 < µ2.
Equation (24) cannot yet be solved for the expected evolution of
the relative capital stock because of the dependence of the expected
evolution of i’s relative price (the “forcing term” on the right-hand
side) on the expected evolution of the relative capital stock itself,
for reasons just discussed. However, one may note that insofar as i’s
decision problem is locally convex, so that the ﬁrst-order conditions
characterize a locally unique optimal plan, the optimal decision for i’s
relative price in the event that the price is reset at date t must depend
only on i’s relative capital stock at date t and on the economy’s
aggregate state. Thus a log-linear approximation to i’s pricing rule
must take the form
pˆ∗t (i) = pˆ
∗
t − ψk˜t(i), (25)
where pˆ∗t depends only on the aggregate state (and so is the same
for all i), and ψ is a coeﬃcient to be determined below.
Note that the assumption that the ﬁrms that reset prices at date
t are drawn with uniform probability from the entire population
implies that the average value of k˜t(i) over the set of ﬁrms that reset
prices is zero (just as it is over the entire population of ﬁrms). Hence
pˆ∗t is also the average relative price chosen by ﬁrms that reset prices
at date t, and the overall rate of price inﬂation will be given (in our
log-linear approximation) by
πt =
1− α
α
pˆ∗t . (26)
Substitution of this, along with (25), into (22) then yields
Etp˜t+1(i) = αp˜t(i)− (1− α)ψk˜t+1(i). (27)
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Similarly, the optimal quantity of investment in any period t must
depend only on i’s relative capital stock in that period, its relative
price (which matters as a separate argument of the decision rule in
the event that the price is not reset in period t), and the economy’s
aggregate state. Thus a log-linear approximation to i’s investment
rule must imply an expression of the form
k˜t+1(i) = λk˜t(i)− τ p˜t(i), (28)
where the coeﬃcients λ and τ remain to be determined. This in turn
implies that
Etk˜t+2(i) = λk˜t+1(i)− τEtp˜t+1(i)
= [λ + (1− α)τψ]k˜t+1(i)− ατp˜t(i),
using (27) to substitute for Etp˜t+1(i) in the second line. Using this
to substitute for Etk˜t+2(i) in (24), and again using (27) to substi-
tute for Etp˜t+1(i), we obtain a linear relation that can be solved for
k˜t+1(i) as a linear function of k˜t(i) and p˜t(i). The conjectured solu-
tion (28) satisﬁes this equation, so that the ﬁrst-order condition (24)
is satisﬁed, if and only if the coeﬃcients λ and τ satisfy
R(λ;ψ) = 0, (29)
(1− αβλ)τ = Ξαλ, (30)
where
R(λ;ψ) ≡ (β−1 − αλ)Q(βλ) + (1− α)Ξψλ
is a cubic polynomial in λ, with a coeﬃcient on the linear term that
depends on the value of the (as yet unknown) coeﬃcient ψ. Condition
(29) involves only λ (given the value of ψ); given a solution for λ,
(30) then yields a unique solution for τ , as long as λ = (αβ)−1.13
The dynamics of the relative capital stock given by (28), together
with (27), imply an expected joint evolution of i’s relative price and
relative capital stock satisfying
13It is obvious from (30) that no solution with λ = (αβ)−1 is possible, as long
as Ξ > 0, as we assume here (i.e., there exists some cost of adjusting capital).
Even in the case that Ξ = 0, such a solution would violate condition (32) below,
so one can exclude this possibility.
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
 Etp˜t+1(i)
k˜t+1(i)

 =

 α + (1− α)τψ −(1− α)ψλ
−τ λ



 p˜t(i)
k˜t(i)

 .
(31)
This implies convergent dynamics—so that both the means and vari-
ances of the distribution of possible future values for i’s relative price
and relative capital stock remain bounded no matter how far in the
future one looks, as long as the ﬂuctuations in the average desired
relative price pˆ∗t are bounded—if and only if both eigenvalues of the
matrix in this equation are inside the unit circle. This stability con-
dition is satisﬁed if and only if
λ < α−1, (32)
λ < 1− τψ, (33)
and
λ > −1− 1− α
1 + α
τψ. (34)
These conditions must be satisﬁed if the implied dynamics of ﬁrm
i’s capital stock and relative price are to remain forever near enough
to the steady-state values around which I have log-linearized the
ﬁrst-order conditions for the solution to the linearized equations to
accurately approximate a solution to the exact ﬁrst-order conditions.
Hence the ﬁrm’s decision problem has a solution that can be char-
acterized using the local methods employed above only if equations
(29)–(30) have a solution (λ, τ) satisfying (32)–(34). I show below
that a unique solution consistent with these bounds exists, in the
case of large enough adjustment costs.
2.2 The Optimal Pricing Rule
I return now to an analysis of the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal
price setting (23). The term that depends on ﬁrm i’s own intended
future behavior is proportional to
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEˆit k˜t+k(i).
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It is now possible to write this term as a function of i’s relative
capital stock at the time of the pricing decision and of the expected
evolution of aggregate variables, allowing me to obtain an expression
of the form (25) for the optimal pricing rule.
Equation (28) for the dynamics of the relative capital stock im-
plies that
Eˆit k˜t+k+1(i) = λEˆ
i
t k˜t+k(i)− τ [p˜t(i)− Et
k∑
j=1
πt+j ]
for each k ≥ 0, using (21) to substitute for Eˆit p˜t+k(i). This can be
integrated forward (given that14 |λ| < (αβ)−1), to obtain
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEˆit k˜t+k(i) = (1− αβλ)−1k˜t(i)
−τ αβ
(1− αβ)(1− αβλ)
[
p˜t(i)−
∞∑
k=1
(αβ)kEtπt+k
]
. (35)
Substitution of this into (23) then yields
φpˆ∗t (i) = (1− αβ)
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEtsˆt+k + φ
∞∑
k=1
(αβ)kEtπt+k − (ω − ν) 1− αβ1− αβλ k˜t(i),
where
φ ≡ 1 + ωθ − (ω − ν)τ αβ
1− αβλ. (36)
The solution to this equation is a pricing rule of the conjectured form
(25) if and only if the process pˆ∗t satisﬁes
φpˆ∗t = (1− αβ)
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEtsˆt+k + φ
∞∑
k=1
(αβ)kEtπt+k, (37)
where sˆt is deﬁned by (19), and the coeﬃcient ψ satisﬁes
φψ = (ω − ν) 1− αβ
1− αβλ. (38)
14Note that (33)–(34) jointly imply that λ > −α−1. Hence any solution con-
sistent with the stability conditions derived in the previous section must imply
convergence of the inﬁnite sum in (35).
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Note that this last equation can be solved for ψ, given the values
of λ and τ ; however, the equations given earlier to determine λ and
τ depend on the value of ψ. Hence equations (29), (30), and (38)
comprise a system of three equations that jointly determine the co-
eﬃcients λ, τ , and ψ of the ﬁrm’s optimal decision rules.
This system of equations can be reduced to a single equation for
λ in the following manner. First, note that for any conjectured value
of λ = 0, (29) can be solved for ψ. This deﬁnes a function15
ψ(λ) ≡ −(1− αβλ)Q(βλ)
(1− α)βΞλ .
Similarly, (30) deﬁnes a function16
τ(λ) ≡ αΞλ
1− αβλ. (39)
Substituting these functions for ψ and τ in (38), one obtains an
equation in which λ is the only unknown variable. Multiplying both
sides of this equation by (1 − α)β(1 − αβλ)Ξλ,17 one obtains the
equation
V (λ) = 0, (40)
where V (λ) is the quartic polynomial
V (λ) ≡ [(1 + ωθ)(1− αβλ)2 − α2β(ω − ν)Ξλ]Q(βλ)
+ β(1− α)(1− αβ)(ω − ν)Ξλ. (41)
Finally, one can write the inequalities (32)–(34) as restrictions
upon the value of λ alone. One observes from the above discussion
that the product τ(λ)ψ(λ) is well deﬁned for all λ, and equal to
−(α/1− α)β−1Q(βλ). Using this function of λ to replace the terms
τψ in the previous inequalities, one obtains an equivalent set of three
inequalities,
λ < α−1, (42)
15The function is not deﬁned if λ = 0. However, since Q(0) = 0, it is clear
from (29) that λ = 0, for any economy with some adjustment costs (so that Ξ is
ﬁnite).
16The function is not deﬁned if λ = (αβ)−1, but that value of λ would be
inconsistent with (33) and (34) holding jointly, as noted above.
17This expression is necessarily nonzero in the case of the kind of solution that
we seek, for the reasons noted in the previous two footnotes.
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α
1 + α
β−1Q(βλ)− 1 < λ < α
1− αβ
−1Q(βλ) + 1, (43)
that λ must satisfy.
I can then summarize my characterization of a ﬁrm’s optimal
pricing and investment behavior as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the ﬁrm’s decision problem has
a solution in which, for any small enough initial log relative capital
stock and log relative price of the individual ﬁrm, and in the case that
the exogenous disturbance qt and the aggregate variables Yˆt, Kˆt, λˆt,
and πt forever satisfy tight enough bounds, both the conditional
expectation Etkˆt+j(i) and the conditional variance vartkˆt+j(i) remain
bounded for all j, with bounds that can be made as tight as one likes
by choosing suﬃciently tight bounds on the initial conditions and
the evolution of the aggregate variables.18 Then the ﬁrm’s optimal
decision rules can be approximated by log-linear rules of the form
(25) for pˆ∗t (i) in periods when the ﬁrm reoptimizes its price and
(28) for the investment decision k˜t+1(i) each period. The coeﬃcient
λ in (28) is a root of the quartic equation (40), that satisﬁes the
inequalities (42)–(43). The coeﬃcient τ in (28) is furthermore equal
to τ(λ), where the function τ(·) is deﬁned by (30), and the coeﬃcient
ψ in (25) is equal to ψ(λ), where the function ψ(·) is deﬁned by (38).
Finally, the intercept pˆ∗t in (25) is given by (37), in which expression
the process {sˆt} is deﬁned by (19).
This result gives a straightforward algorithm that can be used to
solve for the ﬁrm’s decision rules, in the case that local methods
suﬃce to give an approximate characterization of optimal behavior
in the event of small enough disturbances and a small enough initial
departure of the individual ﬁrm’s situation from that of an average
ﬁrm. The two decision rules (25) and (28), together with the law of
motion
p˜t(i) = p˜t−1(i)− πt
for any period t in which i does not reoptimize its price, then al-
low a complete solution for the evolution of the ﬁrm’s relative cap-
ital stock and relative price, given its initial relative capital stock
18Note that this is the only condition under which local log-linearizations of
the kind used above can suﬃce to approximately characterize the solution to the
ﬁrm’s problem.
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and relative price and given the evolution of the aggregate variables
{Yˆt, Kˆt, λt, πt, qt}.
2.3 Existence of a Solution
Proposition 1 does not guarantee the existence of a nonexplosive
solution to the ﬁrm’s decision problem. The following result, however,
shows that at least in the case of large enough adjustment costs, there
is a solution of the kind characterized in proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Let household preferences, the production func-
tion, the rate of depreciation of capital, and the frequency of price
changes all be ﬁxed, but consider alternative speciﬁcations of the in-
vestment adjustment-cost function I(·), all of which are twice diﬀer-
entiable, increasing, convex, and satisfy I(1) = δ, I ′(1) = 1. Then for
any adjustment-cost function for which the value of ψ ≡ I ′′(1) > 0 is
large enough, the polynomial (40) has a unique real root λ satisfying
(42)–(43). It follows that the ﬁrm decision problem has a solution
of the kind described in proposition 1. Furthermore, in this solution
0 < λ < 1, and τ , φ, and ψ are all positive. In the limit as Ξ → 0,
λ → 1, τ → 0, φ → 1 + ωθ, and
φ → ω − ν
1 + ωθ
> 0.
This result can be established by considering the way in which
the polynomial (40) depends on the value of Ξ, which in turn varies
inversely with ψ. Note that the steady-state allocation associated
with zero inﬂation (or ﬂexible prices) is determined independently
of the assumed degree of adjustment costs, and so the values of the
parameters α, β, δ, ν, ω, θ, ρy, and ρk are all given, regardless of the
variation considered in the value of ψ. The coeﬃcient Ξ is then equal
to a positive constant divided by ψ, so that one may equivalently
consider the consequences of varying the value of Ξ while holding
ﬁxed the values of the parameters listed above. I am then interested
in the roots of V (λ) as the value of Ξ approaches zero.
Since the deﬁnition (41) involves the polynomial Q(z), it is ﬁrst
necessary to consider how this polynomial depends on the value of
Ξ. One observes that
Q(z) = z2 − (1 + β + cΞ)z + β,
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where
c ≡ ρk
ρyθ
> 0.
One can then write
V (λ; Ξ) = V¯ (λ) + VΞ(λ)Ξ +
1
2
VΞΞ(λ)Ξ2,
where the polynomials
V¯ (λ) ≡ (1 + ωθ)(1− αβλ)2β(1− λ)(1− βλ),
VΞ(λ) ≡ β(1−αβλ)[1−α(1+β)+αβλ](ω−ν)λ−(1+ωθ)(1−αβλ)2cλ,
and VΞΞ(λ) are each independent of the value of Ξ.
When Ξ = 0, the roots of V (λ) are simply the roots of V¯ (λ),
which are easily seen to be λ1 = 1, λ2 = β−1, and λ3 = λ4 = (αβ)−1.
By continuity, any real roots in the case of a small enough positive
value of Ξ will also have to be close to one of the roots of V¯ (λ).
It is easily seen that no such root can satisfy the inequalities (42)–
(43), unless it is a root near 1. Because Q(βλ2; 0)Q(1; 0) = 0, the
right-most term in (43) is equal to 1, so that the second inequality
is violated when λ = λ2,Ξ = 0. By continuity, the second inequality
of (43) will also necessarily be violated by any root near λ2 in the
case of any small enough value of Ξ. Similarly, because Q(βλ3; 0) =
Q(α−1; 0) = α−1(α−1 − β)(1 − α), the right-most term is negative,
and the second inequality is again violated, when λ = λ3 = λ4,
Ξ = 0. Hence any roots near these will also violate the inequality
in the case of any small enough value of Ξ. Thus there can be at
most one root of (40) that satisﬁes the inequalities for small positive
values of Ξ, and it must be near 1.
Because V¯ ′(1) < 0, V (λ) will continue to have a real root λ1(Ξ)
near 1 for all small enough values of Ξ, and the implicit function
theorem implies that
dλ1
dΞ
(0) = −VΞ(1)
V¯ ′(1)
.
Since
VΞ(1) = β(1− αβ)(1− α)(ω − ν)− (1 + ωθ)(1− αβ)2c
< (1− αβ)2[(ω − ν)− (1 + ωθ)c]
= (1− αβ)2[(ωρ−1y − 1)ν − c] < 0,
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using the fact that ρy > ω in the ﬁnal line and
V¯ ′(1) = −(1 + ωθ)β(1− β)(1− αβ)2 < 0,
it follows that
dλ1
dΞ
(0) < 0.
Thus there is a real root 0 < λ1 < 1 for all small enough positive
values of Ξ. This root necessarily also satisﬁes (42).
Since Q(β; 0) = 0, the left-most term of (43) is near –1 for all
small enough values of Ξ; hence the ﬁrst inequality of (43) is satisﬁed
by the root λ1 as well. However, both sides of the second inequality
are equal to 1 when Ξ = 0; thus in order to determine whether the
inequality holds when Ξ > 0, one must determine the sign of the
derivative
D ≡ d
dΞ
[
λ1(Ξ)− α1− α
Q(βλ1(Ξ); Ξ)
β
]
at Ξ = 0. Since
d
dΞ
Q(βλ1(Ξ); Ξ) = −β(1− β)dλ1
dΞ
− βc
at Ξ = 0, it follows that
D =
1− αβ
1− α
dλ1
dΞ
+
α
1− αc
=
(ω − ν)− (1 + ωθ)c
(1− β)(1 + ωθ)
=
[(ωρ−1y − 1)ν − c]
(1− β)(1 + ωθ) < 0.
Thus for all small enough Ξ > 0, the second inequality of (43) holds
as well, and λ = λ1(Ξ) is the solution asserted to exist in the propo-
sition.
It then follows from (39) that associated with this solution is a
positive value of τ , and that τ → 0 as Ξ → 0. It similarly follows from
(36) that the associated value of φ is positive for all small enough
values of Ξ, and that φ → 1 + ωθ as Ξ → 0. Finally, it follows from
these results and (38) that the associated value of ψ is positive,19
19Recall that our assumptions require that ω > ν.
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and that it approaches the positive limit stated in the proposition
as Ξ → 0. Proposition 2 is thus established.
Proposition 2 guarantees that a solution to the ﬁrm’s optimiza-
tion problem that can be characterized using the local methods em-
ployed above will exist for at least some economies, namely, those
in which adjustment costs are large enough. The proposition also
implies that in the limit of large adjustment costs, the optimal price-
setting rule approaches the one derived in Woodford (2003, chap. 3)
under the assumption of an exogenously given capital stock for each
ﬁrm. Thus the exogenous-capital model represents a useful approx-
imation to the equilibrium dynamics in a model with endogenous
capital accumulation, if adjustment costs are large enough.
Numerical exploration of the properties of the polynomial (40)
suggests that adjustment costs do not have to be large in order for
the analysis given above to apply. In ﬁgure 1, model parameters are
assigned the values given in table 1,20 while the values of α and ψ are
allowed to vary. The ﬁgure indicates for which part of the α−ψ plane
the polynomial (40) has a unique real root satisfying the bounds
(42)–(43). Except in the case of very high values of α (α > 0.93,
corresponding to an average interval between price changes longer
than three and one-half years), a unique real root of this kind exists
Table 1. Numerical Parameter Values
β 0.99
ν 0.11
φ−1h 0.75
ωp 0.33
(θ − 1)−1 0.15
δ 0.12
20These are the same parameter values used in the numerical illustrations in
Woodford (2004), which are in turn chosen for comparability with the numerical
analyses of related models in Woodford (2003). (The justiﬁcation for interest in
these values is discussed in both of those sources.) Thus, for example, in ﬁgure
1, one sees that if α = 0.66, a unique solution exists for all possible values of

ψ ; this explains why it is possible to present solutions for alternative values of

ψ in ﬁgure 1 of Woodford (2004). In this calibration of the model, periods are
understood to correspond to quarters.
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Figure 1. Values of α and ψ for which a Solution of the
Kind Characterized in Proposition 1 Exists
in the case of any ψ > 0. If we suppose that ψ = 3 (the calibration
used in Woodford 2004), then a solution exists in the case of any
α less than 0.978 (i.e., as long as prices are changed at least once
every eleven years, on average). In the case of very high values of
α, a solution does not exist, except in the case of very high values
of ψ,21 and when it does not, the solution to the ﬁrm’s problem
cannot be characterized using the local methods employed above.22
But such high values of α are clearly not empirically realistic, so we
need not be concerned with this case.
21It may appear from the ﬁgure that no solution is possible when α exceeds
0.99, but this is because the vertical axis is truncated at 
ψ = 10. If α = 0.995,
a solution exists in the case of all 
ψ > 22.2; if α = 0.999, a solution exists in
the case of all 
ψ > 88.2. Thus a solution does always exist in the case of large
enough adjustment costs, in accordance with proposition 2.
22This may, for example, be due to a failure of the ﬁrm’s problem to be locally
convex. I do not further investigate the problem here, as it does not appear to
arise in cases of practical interest.
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3. Inﬂation Dynamics
I now consider the implications of the analysis above for the evo-
lution of the overall inﬂation rate. I show that the model of price
setting presented above implies the existence of a New Keynesian
Phillips curve of the form (1), and then consider the interpretation
of empirical estimates of the slope coeﬃcient ξ in this relation.
3.1 A New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Recall that the average log relative price set by ﬁrms that reoptimize
at date t is given by (37). This equation can be quasi-diﬀerenced
(after dividing by φ23) to yield
pˆ∗t = (1− αβ)φ−1sˆt + αβEtπt+1 + αβEtpˆ∗t+1.
Then, using (26) to substitute for pˆ∗t , one obtains a relation of the
form (1), where
ξ ≡ (1− α)(1− αβ)
αφ
. (44)
Equation (1) is the corrected form of equation (3.17) in Woodford
(2003, chap. 5). Together with (19), it provides a complete charac-
terization of the equilibrium dynamics of inﬂation, given the evo-
lution of Yˆt, Kˆt, and λˆt. This pair of equations can be thought of
as constituting the “aggregate supply block” of the model with en-
dogenous capital. They generalize the aggregate-supply equation of
the constant-capital model (expounded in Woodford 2003, chap. 3)
to take account of the eﬀects of changes in the capital stock on real
marginal cost, and hence on the short-run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation
and output.
In the constant-capital model, (19) (after using [12] to substitute
for λˆt) reduces to
sˆt = ω(Yˆt − qt) + σ−1(Yˆt − gt),
which can be equivalently written as
sˆt = (ω + σ−1)Y˜t, (45)
23It follows from (38) that φ = 0, given that (as already discussed) λ = (αβ)−1.
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where Y˜t is the “output gap,” deﬁned as the (log) diﬀerence between
actual and ﬂexible-price equilibrium output. Substituting this rela-
tion into (1), one obtains the familiar output-gap formulation of the
New Keynesian Phillips curve,
πt = κY˜t + βEtπt+1, (46)
where κ ≡ (ω + σ−1)ξ > 0.
In the model with endogenous (and ﬁrm-speciﬁc) capital, instead,
(45) takes the more general form
sˆt = (ω + σ−1)Y˜t − σ−1I˜t, (47)
where I˜t indicates the gap between actual investment (speciﬁcally,
the value of Iˆt) and its ﬂexible-price equilibrium level.24 If one sub-
stitutes this relation instead into (1), one obtains a generalization of
(46),
πt = κY˜t − κI I˜t + βEtπt+1,
where κ is deﬁned as before, but now κI ≡ σ−1ξ > 0. Thus while (1)
continues to apply, the relation between inﬂation and real activity
is no longer as simple as (46). This is a further reason (in addition
to the lack of simple empirical measures of the ﬂexible-price equilib-
rium level of output) why it has been appropriate for the empirical
literature to focus more on estimation of the inﬂation equation (1)
than of the corresponding aggregate-supply relation.
As with equation (3.17) in Woodford (2003, chap. 5), equation
(1) implies that one can solve for the inﬂation rate as a function of
current and expected future real marginal cost, resulting in a relation
of the form
πt =
∞∑
j=0
ΨjEtsˆt+j . (48)
The correct formula for these coeﬃcients is given by
Ψj = ξβj ,
just as in the model with constant capital discussed in Woodford
(2003, chap. 3). Hence the coeﬃcients do not decay as rapidly with
24See Woodford (2004) for further discussion of the deﬁnition of this and related
“gap” variables in this model.
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increasing j as is shown in ﬁgure 5.6 of Woodford (2003), in the case
of ﬁnite adjustment costs. Nor do the coeﬃcients ever change sign
with increasing j, as occurs in the ﬁgure. In the case that ξ > 0
(as implied by the calibrated parameter values proposed below), an
increase in the expected future level of real marginal costs unam-
biguously requires that inﬂation increase, and the degree to which
inﬂation determination is forward looking is even greater than is
indicated by the ﬁgure in Woodford (2003).
3.2 The Case of a Rental Market for Capital
I now brieﬂy compare the results obtained above to those that would
be obtained under the assumption of a competitive rental market for
capital services.25 In the literature, when models of staggered pricing
have allowed for endogenous capital accumulation (as, for example,
in Yun [1996] or Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan [2000]), they have
typically assumed that ﬁrms purchase capital services on a competi-
tive rental market, rather than accumulating ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital as
in the model above. This alternative assumption is of considerable
convenience, since it allows price-setting decisions to be analyzed sep-
arately from the decision to accumulate capital.26 However, while the
assumption of an economy-wide rental market for capital is purely a
convenience in the case of standard real business-cycle models (i.e.,
one-sector models with a competitive goods market), it is no longer
innocuous in a model where ﬁrms are price setters, and so must con-
sider the consequences for their proﬁts of setting a price diﬀerent
from that of their competitors. As we shall see, alternative assump-
tions about the way in which capital services can be obtained (with
a production technology that is otherwise the same) lead to dif-
ferent conclusions regarding aggregate dynamics. In particular, the
predicted slope of the Phillips-curve trade-oﬀ can be aﬀected to an
extent that is quantitatively signiﬁcant.
I shall consider two versions of a model with a competitive rental
market for capital services. In each case, the production technology
25Sveen and Weinke (2004b) similarly compare the consequences of these two
assumptions, but instead focus on the diﬀerences that result for the implied
impulse responses to disturbances in a complete dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) model.
26The same assumption was used, for example, in the DSGE model with
oligopolistic pricing of Rotemberg and Woodford (1995).
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and the technology of capital accumulation are as described in the
introductory paragraphs of this paper, except that now capital goods
are either accumulated by households and rented to the ﬁrms that
produce the goods that are used for consumption and investment, or
they are accumulated by a special set of ﬁrms that accumulate capi-
tal and then rent capital services to the goods-producing ﬁrms. (Our
equilibrium relations will be the same, whether capital is accumu-
lated by households or by a special set of ﬁrms.) There is assumed to
be a competitive market for capital services each period, with rental
rate ρt in period t. (Note that this rental rate is no longer indexed
by the ﬁrm that uses the capital.)
It follows that for each household or ﬁrm i that accumulates
capital, its holdings of capital {kt(i)} must evolve in accordance with
the ﬁrst-order condition (5), except that now the ﬁrm-speciﬁc shadow
value ρt+1(i) is replaced by the market rental rate ρt+1, with the
same value for all i. Log-linearization of this condition again leads to
a relation of the form (6) for each i, but with ρˆt+1(i) replaced simply
by ρˆt+1. Assuming that one starts from a symmetric distribution of
capital k0(i) = K0 for all i, one will similarly have a common capital
stock kt(i) = Kt in all subsequent periods, since each household or
ﬁrm solves an identical optimization problem. The aggregate capital
stock will then also evolve in accordance with (5) or, up to a log-
linear approximation, in accordance with (6).
An optimal demand for capital services by a goods-producing
ﬁrm i (not to be confused with a ﬁrm i that accumulates capital)
again requires that the ﬁrm’s output-capital ratio satisfy (7), though
(7) is now a ﬁrst-order condition for a ﬁrm that takes as given the
cost of capital services ρt, rather than a deﬁnition of the shadow value
of additional capital services, and ρt(i) must now be replaced by the
common rental rate ρt for all i. There are two possible assumptions
that may be made regarding labor inputs. In the literature, when a
rental market for capital services is assumed, it is often also assumed
that all sectors hire the same kind of labor, and that there is a single
economy-wide labor market as well; this is the case of “homogeneous
factor markets” treated in Woodford (2003, chap. 3).27 In this case,
27It is the case assumed in the derivation of a New Keynesian Phillips curve in
Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and in the baseline case considered in Sbordone (1998,
2002). Note that a single economy-wide labor market is also assumed in the anal-
ysis of the consequences of an exogenous ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital stock in Sbordone
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every ﬁrm i faces a common wage, so that wt(i) = wt. It then follows
from (7) that each ﬁrm i will choose a common output-capital ratio;
ﬁrms with higher demand for their products (because of lower prices)
will choose to use a proportionately higher quantity of capital ser-
vices and a proportionately higher quantity of labor as well. It then
follows from (14) that the marginal cost of output supply will be the
same for all ﬁrms i and independent of the quantity produced by any
ﬁrm, so that st(i) = st for all i, where the common real marginal
cost st is an increasing function of both ρt and wt. Equation (18)
then reduces simply to
sˆt(i) = sˆt.
In this case, frequently assumed in previous derivations of the
New Keynesian Phillips curve, (20) implies that the optimal relative
price that should be chosen by a ﬁrm that resets its price at date t
is given by
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− αβ)
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEˆit

sˆt+k + k∑
j=1
πt+j

 (49)
instead of (23). In this case, the quantities inside the brackets are
not ﬁrm speciﬁc, and there is no need to distinguish between the
conditional expectations Eˆit [·] and Et[·]. Nor is there any need to
solve for the dynamics of a ﬁrm’s relative capital stock in order to
evaluate the right-hand side of (49). The right-hand side of (49) is
the same for all i, and thus gives the value of pˆ∗t . Equation (49) then
leads directly to an inﬂation equation of the form (1), with
ξh ≡
(1− α)(1− αβ)
α
> 0. (50)
Alternatively, we may assume the existence of a sector-speciﬁc
labor market for each sector, as in the model developed in this pa-
per for the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital or the model of “speciﬁc
(1998, 2002) and in Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001). For this reason, the
formula for ξ(α) presented by those authors for the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital
diﬀers from the one derived in Woodford (2003, chap. 3) under the assumption
of industry-speciﬁc labor markets. Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) also assume an
economy-wide labor market even in their model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, though
in their case each ﬁrm’s capital stock is endogenous as in the model developed
here.
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factor markets” treated in Woodford (2003, chap. 3). In this case,
the real wage for the type of labor hired by ﬁrm i is given by a
sector-speciﬁc labor supply equation (8). Substituting this into (7)
and log-linearizing, we again obtain equilibrium relation (9) for each
ﬁrm i, except that ρˆt(i) must now be replaced by the common rental
rate ρˆt. Because ρt is now the same for all ﬁrms, this conditional for
cost-minimizing production by ﬁrm i implies that the ﬁrm’s relative
capital stock will be a monotonic function of its relative sales, so
that
ρk(kˆt(i)− Kˆt) = ρy(yˆt(i)− Yˆt) (51)
for all i at any date.
The marginal cost of production of each ﬁrm i is again given by
(17), but we can now use (51) to substitute for the ﬁrm’s relative
demand for capital as a function of its relative sales. Then, again
using (4) to substitute for the relative sales of ﬁrm i, one obtains
sˆt(i) = sˆt − χθp˜t(i) (52)
instead of (18), where
χ ≡ ωρk − (ω − ν)ρy
ρk
=
νωp
ρk(φh − 1)
> 0.
Note that there is no longer any dependence on the ﬁrm’s relative
capital stock (which is no longer a state variable for the ﬁrm’s opti-
mization problem).
Once again substituting (52) for st+k(i) and (21) for Eˆit p˜t+k(i)
in (20), one now obtains
(1 + χθ)pˆ∗t (i) = (1− αβ)
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEˆit

sˆt+k + (1 + χθ) k∑
j=1
πt+j


(53)
for the optimal relative price that should be chosen by a ﬁrm that
resets its price at date t. One can again replace the conditional expec-
tation Eˆit [·] by Et[·], and one again observes that pˆ∗t (i) is the same for
all i, so that one can replace pˆ∗t (i) by pˆ∗t . Relation (53) is then of the
same form as relation (37) for the model above with endogenous but
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ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, but with the coeﬃcient φ in the earlier equation
here replaced by 1 + χθ. One again obtains a pricing relation of the
form (1), but with elasticity
ξr ≡
(1− α)(1− αβ)
α(1 + χθ)
> 0. (54)
Thus each model leads to a Phillips-curve relation of the same
form (1), except that in each case the elasticity ξ > 0 is a dif-
ferent function of underlying model parameters. The quantitative
diﬀerence made by the alternative assumptions can be illustrated
through a numerical example. Let us again assume the parameter
values given in table 1, and furthermore now specify that ψ = 3,
as assumed in Woodford (2004). Figure 2 then plots the value of ξ
corresponding to any given frequency of price change (indicated by
Figure 2. The Relation between ξ and α under Four
Alternative Assumptions about Factor Markets
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the value of α on the horizontal axis) under each of four possible
assumptions. The function ξh(α) deﬁned in (50) indicates how the
elasticity ξ in (1) varies with α in the case of homogeneous factor
markets. The function ξr(α) deﬁned in (54) applies instead in the
case of industry-speciﬁc labor but an economy-wide rental market
for capital. The function ξf (α) deﬁned in (44) applies instead in the
case of industry-speciﬁc labor and ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.28 And ﬁnally,
the function ξc(α) is the corresponding relation derived in Woodford
(2003, chap. 3) for the case of the model with industry-speciﬁc labor
and a constant quantity of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.29 The function ξc(α)
corresponds to the limit of ξf (α) as ψ is made unboundedly large;
it follows from proposition 1 that this is given by
ξc ≡
(1− α)(1− αβ)
α(1 + ωθ)
> 0.
We see from the ﬁgure that for any given value of α (in the
range for which all four functions are deﬁned), the model with ho-
mogeneous factor markets implies the highest value of ξ, as in this
case the model possesses the fewest sources of “real rigidities” in the
sense of Ball and Romer (1990). The fact that an increase in de-
mand in one part of the economy bids up the price of factor inputs
throughout the economy creates a source of “strategic substitutabil-
ity” between the pricing decisions in diﬀerent sectors of the economy
(the fact that others keep their prices low increases your marginal
cost of production, and so gives you a reason for higher prices, rather
than lower ones); this speeds up the rate of adjustment of the ag-
gregate price index to changes in demand conditions.30 There are
greater real rigidities, and hence a ﬂatter Phillips curve, in the case
of industry-speciﬁc labor markets, even if we continue to assume an
economy-wide rental market for capital services; for in this case, an
28As shown in ﬁgure 1, the function ξf is only deﬁned for values of α lower
than a critical value on the order of 0.978. The other functions are deﬁned for all
values of α between zero and one.
29This is called the model with “speciﬁc factor markets” in Woodford (2003,
chap. 3).
30See Woodford (2003, chap. 3) for further discussion of why the Phillips curve
is relatively steep in this case, building upon the seminal treatment by Kimball
(1995). The discussion there, conducted under the assumption of an exogenously
given capital stock, still gives the essential insight into why the speciﬁcity of
factor markets matters.
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increase in demand in one part of the economy still bids up the price
of capital services throughout the economy, but does not similarly
aﬀect wages in other sectors. There are still greater real rigidities,
and a still ﬂatter Phillips curve, if we assume ﬁrm-speciﬁc invest-
ment, because in this case an increase in demand in one part of the
economy that increases the shadow value of capital there has no im-
mediate eﬀect on the shadow cost of capital services in other parts
of the economy.
Real rigidities are the greatest if we assume, as in the model with
“speciﬁc factor markets” in Woodford (2003, chap. 3), that the capi-
tal stock of each ﬁrm is exogenously given, and hence never aﬀected
by diﬀerential shadow values of capital in diﬀerent sectors. In the
model with endogenous ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital developed here, a sus-
tained higher shadow value of capital in part of the economy will
eventually raise the shadow value of capital services everywhere, as
a result of diﬀerential rates of investment in the sectors with diﬀer-
ing shadow values of capital. Thus capital is still reallocated among
sectors in response to rate-of-return diﬀerentials, albeit with a delay,
as long as investment adjustment costs are not too large. However,
the ﬁgure shows that in our calibrated example, an empirically re-
alistic level of adjustment costs results in a value of ξ that is quite
close to what would be implied by the exogenous-capital model with
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital (though slightly larger), while it is considerably
lower than would be implied by the assumption of instantaneous re-
allocation of capital across sectors so as to equalize the shadow value
of capital services. Thus the implicit assumption of an exogenously
evolving capital stock in derivations of the Phillips curve for mod-
els with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital by authors such as Sbordone (1998)
appears not to have been a source of any great inaccuracy.31 The
endogeneity of the capital stock is instead of greater signiﬁcance for
31Coenen and Levin (2004) also discuss the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital in in-
creasing real rigidities, in the context of a model with Taylor-style ﬁxed-period
price commitments, which allows separate econometric identiﬁcation of the length
of time between price changes, on the one hand, and the elasticity of a ﬁrm’s de-
sired relative price with respect to aggregate output, on the other. They are
concerned with whether the estimated value of the latter elasticity can be rec-
onciled with the microfoundations of the ﬁrm’s pricing decision, and argue that
allowing for ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is important in doing so. Like Sbordone (1998)
and Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001), they assume that each ﬁrm’s capital
stock is ﬁxed in analyzing this issue.
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predictions about the equilibrium responses of inﬂation or output
to aggregate disturbances, as shown in Woodford (2004), because of
the eﬀects of the endogenous rate of investment on the evolution of
real marginal cost, as indicated by equation (47).
3.3 Additional Sources of Real Rigidities
Even the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital developed above still ab-
stracts from a number of possible sources of real rigidities. Here I
brieﬂy consider the eﬀects of two generalizations that are discussed
in more detail (though in the context of a model with exogenous
capital) in Woodford (2003, chap. 3, sec. 1.4).
First, I shall now suppose that each diﬀerentiated good is pro-
duced using not only labor and capital, but also intermediate in-
puts produced by other industries. As in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1995), I assume a production function of the form
yt(i) = min
[
kt(i)f(Atht(i)/kt(i))
1− sm ,
mt(i)
sm
]
,
generalizing (3), where f(·) has the same properties as before, mt(i)
denotes the quantity of materials inputs used by ﬁrm i in period t,
and 0 ≤ sm < 1 is a parameter of the production technology that can
be identiﬁed, for purposes of calibration, with the share of materials
costs in the value of gross output. The materials inputs are measured
in units of the composite good.
The shadow value to ﬁrm i of an additional unit of capital is then
given by
ρt(i) =
wt(i)
At
f−1((1− sm)yt(i)/kt(i))[φ((1− sm)yt(i)/kt(i))− 1],
generalizing (7), where φ(·) is the same function as before. But be-
cause the log deviation of (1 − sm)yt(i)/kt(i) from its steady-state
value is equal to the log deviation of yt(i)/kt(i) from its steady-state
value, the log-linear relation (9) continues to apply, regardless of the
size of the materials share.
With intermediate inputs, the real marginal cost of production
can be written as
st(i) = (1− sm)sV At (i) + sm, (55)
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where sV At (i) is the real marginal cost of producing a unit of “real
value added,” by which I mean the homogeneous-degree-one aggre-
gate of primary factors of production given by kt(i)f(Atht(i)/kt(i)).
Equation (15) furthermore takes the more general form
sV At (i) =
vh(f−1((1− sm)yt(i)/kt(i))kt(i)/At; ξt)
λtAtf ′(f−1((1− sm)yt(i)/kt(i))) .
Substituting this into (55) and log-linearizing, I obtain
sˆt(i) = (1− µsm)[ω(yˆt(i)− kˆt(i)− qt) + νkˆt(i)− λˆt], (56)
generalizing (16), where µ ≡ θ/(θ−1) > 1 is the steady-state markup
(ratio of price to marginal cost).32 The reduced elasticity of real
marginal cost with respect to the ﬁrm’s level of production when sm
is positive (but less than µ−1) indicates greater real rigidities.
Second, I shall suppose that substitution possibilities among the
diﬀerentiated goods are no longer necessarily described by the famil-
iar Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator that leads to the constant-elasticity de-
mand function (4) for individual goods. If I instead assume only that
the aggregator belongs to the more general family of homogeneous-
degree-one functions considered by Kimball (1995), the elasticity of
demand varies with the relative price of (and hence the relative de-
mand for) individual good i. The relative demand for an individual
good is again a decreasing function of the relative price,33 but the
function need not be a constant-elasticity function, as in (4).
As a result, the desired markup of the supplier’s price over the
marginal cost of supply will no longer be a constant µ > 1, but rather
a function µ(yt(i)/Yt) of the relative output of the good, where Yt
is aggregate output, deﬁned using the Kimball aggregator. To a log-
linear approximation, the deviation of the log desired markup from
its steady-state level (that I shall again call µ) is equal to µy˜t(i),
32In the case of the model with generalized preferences introduced in the next
paragraph, this relation still applies, but θ > 1 indicates the steady-state elasticity
of substitution among diﬀerentiated goods, rather than a coeﬃcient of the Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator.
33As in the model developed above, it is assumed that both household prefer-
ences and the production technology of ﬁrms depend only on the quantity pur-
chased of the composite good deﬁned by this aggregator. Hence the purchases of
each buyer, for whatever purpose, will be distributed across diﬀerentiated goods
in the same proportions.
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where µ is the elasticity of the function µ(·), evaluated at the steady
state (i.e., at a relative output of 1), and y˜t(i) is the log relative
output. The demand function can again be log-linearized to yield
y˜t(i) = −θp˜t(i),
where θ > 1 is now the steady-state elasticity of demand (and not
necessarily also the elasticity near a relative price other than 1). One
can then show that the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal price setting
under Calvo staggering of price changes takes the form
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEˆit [p˜t+k(i)− (1 + θµ)−1sˆt+k(i)] = 0, (57)
generalizing (20), just as in Woodford (2003, chap. 3). The only dif-
ference here is that real marginal cost will depend on the ﬁrm’s en-
dogenous, ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital stock in the way treated above. One
observes directly from (57) that a value µ > 0 will increase the
degree of real rigidities, by reducing the sensitivity of the desired
relative price to variations in real marginal cost, and hence to vari-
ations in the ﬁrm’s output.
Substituting (56) into (57), I now obtain
Γ1pˆ∗t (i) = (1− αβ)
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEˆit

sˆt+k + Γ1 k∑
j=1
πt+j − Γ2k˜t+k(i)

 ,
(58)
generalizing (23), where
Γ1 ≡ 1 + θµ + (1− µsm)ωθ, Γ2 ≡ (1− µsm)(ω − ν).
Here only the expressions for Γ1 and Γ2 have become more com-
plex. One can then show, using the same reasoning as above, that
the solution to the ﬁrm’s optimization problem is characterized by
proposition 1, except that (36) must be replaced by
φ ≡ Γ1 − Γ2τ αβ1− αβλ, (59)
and (41) must be replaced by
V (λ) ≡ [Γ1(1− αβλ)2 − α2βΓ2Ξλ]Q(βλ) + β(1− α)(1− αβ)Γ2Ξλ.
(60)
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One can similarly obtain once again an aggregate-supply relation
of the form (1), where the elasticity ξ is deﬁned by (44), but now
using the generalized deﬁnition (59) of φ. Alternatively, one can write
the aggregate-supply relation as
πt = ξsˆV At + βEtπt+1, (61)
in which case
ξ ≡ (1− µsm)(1− α)(1− αβ)
αφ
, (62)
where φ is deﬁned by (59), using the fact that
sˆt = (1− µsm)sˆV At ,
from a log-linearization of (55). The alternative form (61) is actually
the one that is estimated in the literature, since (under the assump-
tion of a Cobb-Douglas production function for “value added”) it is
sV At rather than st that is proportional to real unit labor cost (the
proxy for “marginal cost” that is used in empirical work).
The additional sources of real rigidities aﬀect the value of ξ asso-
ciated with a given average frequency of price adjustment, as shown
in ﬁgure 3. As in Woodford (2003, chap. 3, sec. 1.4), I shall consider
the consequences of an intermediate input share such that µsm = 0.6,
and a nonconstant elasticity of substitution among diﬀerentiated
goods such that θµ = 1. The ﬁgure plots the functional relation
ξ(α) deﬁned by (44) for each of four possible combinations of pa-
rameter values: the baseline case, in which sm = 0, µ = 0; a case
with intermediate inputs, in which µsm = 0.6, though again µ = 0;
a case with Kimball preferences, in which sm = 0 but θµ = 1; and
ﬁnally, a case with both additional sources of real rigidities, in which
µsm = 0.6, θµ = 1. In all four cases, it is assumed that labor markets
are industry speciﬁc, capital is endogenous and ﬁrm speciﬁc, and the
numerical parameters other than those just listed are as in the case
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital plotted in ﬁgure 2. (The function ξ(α) in
the baseline case here corresponds to the function ξf (α) in ﬁgure 2.)
One observes that for each of the values of α considered, either
intermediate inputs or Kimball preferences with µ > 0 lower the
implied value of ξ, and if both departures from the baseline model
are considered simultaneously, the implied value of ξ is still lower.
Hence allowance for either of these empirically plausible additional
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Figure 3. The Relation between ξ and α with Additional
Sources of Real Rigidities
sources of real rigidities further reduces the implied slope of the
Phillips curve, without any change in the assumed frequency of price
changes. The results obtained here are quite similar to those obtained
in Woodford (2003, chap. 3) for the case of a model in which each
ﬁrm’s capital stock is given exogenously (see table 3.1 there).
3.4 Consequences for Estimates of the Frequency of Price
Adjustment
Because alternative assumptions about the speciﬁcity of factor mar-
kets aﬀect the location of the curve ξ(α), as shown in ﬁgure 2, it
follows that the consequences of an estimate of ξ for the frequency of
price adjustment are correspondingly diﬀerent in the diﬀerent cases.
(One should note that estimation of the aggregate-supply relation
[1] only allows an estimate of the elasticity ξ and provides no di-
rect evidence regarding the frequency of price adjustment, nor any
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way of testing which of the alternative possible assumptions about
the speciﬁcity of factor markets is the correct one.) An assumption
of speciﬁc factor markets—either that labor markets are industry
speciﬁc, or that capital is ﬁrm speciﬁc—increases the degree of real
rigidities, relative to an assumption of an economy-wide market for
the services of that factor, and so lowers the value of ξ correspond-
ing to any given value of α. Conversely, it follows that the value
of α required to explain any given value of ξ—and hence the value
of α implied by any given estimate of ξ—is lower the greater the
degree of speciﬁcity of factors. Hence a given degree of sluggishness
in the adjustment of the overall price index to changes in aggregate
conditions can be reconciled with a greater degree of ﬁrm-level ﬂex-
ibility of prices in the case that one assumes more speciﬁc factors of
production.
This is illustrated by the calculations reported in table 2. The
numerical parameter values given in table 1 are again assumed, and
in addition (in the case of the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital) it is
assumed that ψ = 3, as in the baseline case considered in Woodford
Table 2. Interpretation of the Estimated Value of ξ
under Alternative Assumptions about Factor Markets
Implied Values of α
ξ Homogeneous Factor Rental Market Firm Speciﬁc
0.05 .804 .757 .630
0.04 .823 .779 .663
0.03 .845 .806 .703
0.02 .872 .840 .754
Implied Values of T
ξ Homogeneous Factor Rental Market Firm Speciﬁc
0.05 4.57 3.59 2.16
0.04 5.13 4.01 2.43
0.03 5.94 4.65 2.84
0.02 7.32 5.71 3.55
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(2004). The ﬁrst panel of the table then indicates the value of α
that would be implied by a given estimate of the elasticity ξ, under
each of three diﬀerent possible assumptions about factor markets:
homogeneous factor markets; industry-speciﬁc labor markets but a
rental market for capital services; and industry-speciﬁc labor markets
together with endogenous, ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. The range of values
considered for ξ in the table corresponds to the range of values found
in empirical estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (1) for
the United States.34 The second panel of the table shows the implied
values of
T ≡ −1
logα
,
the average time (in quarters) that a price remains ﬁxed,35 for each
of the same possible estimates of ξ under each of the same three
possible assumptions about factor markets.
One observes that the assumption made regarding factor markets
has a substantial eﬀect on the implied frequency of price adjustment,
given any estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve ξ. If, for exam-
ple, one estimates a slope ξ = 0.02—and some estimates using U.S.
34For example, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) report an estimate of 0.023 when they
estimate the “reduced form” equation (1) using U.S. data. When they use an
alternative generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation approach that
yields estimates of α (under the assumption of homogeneous factor markets)
rather than of ξ, the values of ξ implied by the reported estimates (that vary
depending on the sample and moment conditions used) are mostly in the range of
0.02 to 0.04. (It should be noted that when Gal´ı and Gertler report estimates of α,
they are really only estimating a nonlinear transformation of the elasticity ξ that
would correspond to α under the assumption of homogeneous factor markets, and
do not attempt any test of the homogeneous-factor assumption.) Gal´ı, Gertler,
and Lopez-Salido (2001) similarly report estimates of α using U.S. data that
imply values of ξ equal to 0.03 or 0.04. Sbordone (2002) obtains an estimate of
0.055 for U.S. data using a diﬀerent estimation technique, while Sbordone (2004)
obtains an estimate of 0.025 for U.S. data using yet another approach.
35In the literature, estimates of α are often converted into estimates of the
average time between price changes using the alternative formula T = 1/(1−α).
This latter formula is correct if one takes the discrete-time model (in which all
prices change, if they change at all, at a single time each quarter) literally; but
it has the unappealing feature that no matter how ﬂexible prices may be (and
how steep the estimated Phillips curve may be as a result), T must always equal
at least three months. The formula here assumes instead that there is a constant
hazard rate ρ in continuous time for price changes, and that an estimate of α
is an estimate of e−ρ. This means that if one estimates a steep enough Phillips
curve, and hence infers a value of α close enough to 1, the inferred value of T
may be arbitrarily small.
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data are this low, though most reported estimates have been at least
somewhat larger—then under the assumption of homogeneous fac-
tor markets (and the other parametric assumptions in table 1), one
would conclude that the estimate implied an average time between
price changes of over seven quarters. This is implausibly long, given
microeconomic evidence on the frequency of price changes, so that
one might well conclude that the model cannot account for the ob-
served facts about price adjustment, no matter how well it might
ﬁt the joint evolution of overall inﬂation and average marginal cost.
Assuming instead that labor markets are industry speciﬁc, however,
would reduce the implied average time between price changes to less
than six quarters, even if one continues to assume a rental market
for capital services. And allowing for ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital would fur-
ther reduce the implied average time between price changes, to only
three and one-half quarters. This is no longer so implausible, given
the evidence in surveys such as that of Blinder et al. (1998) that
many prices in the United States are changed only once a year or
less.
My ﬁnding that an assumption that capital is ﬁrm speciﬁc re-
duces the average time between price changes implied by estimates
of the aggregate-supply relation (1) conﬁrms the previous results
of Sbordone (1998) and Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001), ob-
tained under an implicit assumption that each ﬁrm’s capital stock is
constant, or evolves exogenously. Figure 2 shows that the assumption
of a constant (or exogenous) capital stock would imply even slightly
greater real rigidities than exist in the case of an endogenous but
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital stock; but the numerical error resulting from
that simplifying assumption is not great, at least if investment ad-
justment costs are of the size assumed here.36 For example, in the
case that ξ = 0.02, under the assumptions of exogenous capital and
industry-speciﬁc labor markets, the value of α would be 0.740 and
the value of T would be 3.28, rather than the values shown in the
third column of table 2. Allowance for a realistic degree of endoge-
nous adjustment of each ﬁrm’s capital stock does not dramatically
change those conclusions.
36As shown in Woodford (2004), adjustment costs of roughly this size are
needed to explain the observed size of output response to an identiﬁed monetary
policy shock, in the context of a simple New Keynesian model that incorporates
the model of investment and price-setting decisions developed here.
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The implied average times between price adjustments shown in
table 2 may still seem a bit too long to square with microeconomic
evidence, even in the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, especially if ξ is
estimated to take a value between 0.2 and 0.3. (Blinder et al. [1998]
report a median time between price changes of three quarters, but
Bils and Klenow [2004] instead report a median of less than two
quarters.) However, a value of ξ of this magnitude can be reconciled
with even greater frequencies of adjustment of individual prices, if
additional empirically plausible sources of real rigidities are taken
into account.
Table 3 shows the values of α and T implied by alternative es-
timates of ξ, under alternative assumptions about the importance
of intermediate inputs and the degree to which the aggregator that
deﬁnes the composite good diﬀers from the Dixit-Stiglitz form. All
numerical parameters except sm and µ take the same values as in
table 2, and in each case it is now assumed that labor markets are
Table 3. Interpretation of the Estimated Value of ξ under
Alternative Assumptions about Input/Output Structure
and Substitutability of Diﬀerentiated Goods
Implied Values of α
ξ Baseline Intermediate Inputs Kimball Both
0.05 .630 .584 .598 .528
0.04 .663 .619 .633 .564
0.03 .703 .662 .674 .609
0.02 .754 .716 .728 .669
Implied Values of T
ξ Baseline Intermediate Inputs Kimball Both
0.05 2.16 1.86 1.95 1.56
0.04 2.43 2.09 2.18 1.75
0.03 2.84 2.42 2.54 2.02
0.02 3.55 3.00 3.15 2.48
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industry speciﬁc and capital is ﬁrm speciﬁc. (Thus the “baseline”
case in table 3 corresponds to the “ﬁrm-speciﬁc” column of table 2.)
The values assumed for sm and µ in the alternative cases are the
same as in ﬁgure 3.
One observes the average time between price changes implied by
any given estimate of ξ falls in the case that one assumes either
of the additional sources of real rigidities, and falls by even more
if one assumes both. Making corrections of both type that remain
within the range of empirically plausible parameter values, one ﬁnds
that a Phillips-curve slope of only 0.02 can be consistent with an
average period between price changes that is less than two and one-
half quarters. A Phillips-curve slope of 0.04 can instead be consistent
with an average period between price changes that is well below two
quarters. Since point estimates of this magnitude for ξ are obtained
in a number of studies (and it is within the 95 percent conﬁdence
interval in an even larger number of cases), one cannot say that
estimates of ξ are too small to be consistent with microeconomic
evidence regarding the frequency with which prices change.
I conclude that there is no necessary conﬂict between the param-
eter values that are required to explain the co-movement between
overall inﬂation and aggregate output, as indicated by Phillips curves
estimated using aggregate time series, on the one hand, and the pa-
rameter values required for consistency with microeconomic obser-
vations, on the other. The appearance of a “micro/macro conﬂict”
results from simplifying assumptions in familiar derivations of the
New Keynesian Phillips curve that are not actually necessary in or-
der to obtain a relation between aggregate time series of that form,
and that are not realistic, either. When one adopts more realistic (or
at the very least, no less realistic) assumptions—industry-speciﬁc la-
bor markets, ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, intermediate inputs required for
production, and a nonconstant elasticity of substitution among dif-
ferentiated goods for both consumption and investment purposes—
the discrepancy between the frequency of price adjustment that is
required to explain the aggregate co-movements and the one that is
indicated by microeconomic data disappears.
A similar conclusion is reached by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004),
Altig et al. (2005), and Matheron (2005) in the context of economet-
ric models that allow for endogenous, ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, follow-
ing the analysis presented above. While the ﬁrst two papers place
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particular stress on the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital in reconciling the
microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence, the assumption of an
aggregator of the Kimball form that departs substantially from the
Dixit-Stiglitz case is also important for the quantitative results of
Eichenbaum and Fisher. Matheron stresses the importance of allow-
ing for industry-speciﬁc labor as well as ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. In the
case of his analysis with euro-area data, a speciﬁcation with ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital but homogeneous labor, as assumed by the other
authors, reduces the estimated time between price revisions relative
to the speciﬁcation with economy-wide markets for both factors, but
not by nearly enough to reconcile the model with microeconomic
evidence on the frequency of price changes; allowing for both ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital and industry-speciﬁc labor, as proposed here, results
in a substantial further reduction in the estimated time between price
revisions.
I have given particular attention to the importance of allowing
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital because, in the case that one allows for en-
dogenous capital accumulation, the assumption that capital is ﬁrm
speciﬁc results in a nontrivial complication in the analysis. It turns
out, however, that the same form of equilibrium relation between in-
ﬂation dynamics and the evolution of average real marginal cost can
be derived under this assumption. Moreover, the relation between
the slope of the Phillips curve and the frequency of price adjustment
that can be derived under the simpler assumption of an exogenously
given capital stock for each ﬁrm turns out to be fairly accurate as an
approximation to the correct relation in the case of an empirically re-
alistic size of adjustment costs for investment. Hence the conclusions
of the earlier literature (beginning with Sbordone 1998) that drew
inferences about the frequency of price adjustment from estimated
Phillips curves under the implicit assumption of an exogenous cap-
ital stock are found to have been essentially correct, even if a more
precise inference can be made using the analysis given here.
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